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Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction Under the Antitrust Laws
Herbert Hovenkamp

*

Introduction
When foreign conduct is involved, the courts customarily appraise its substantive
antitrust significance only after deciding whether the Sherman Act asserts jurisdiction
over it. Nevertheless, “jurisdictional” and “substantive” inquiries are not wholly
independent. Both inquiries rest on judgments about the apparent will of Congress with
respect to foreign transactions. And both reflect two sound propositions: that Congress
did not intend American antitrust law to rule the entire commercial world and that
Congress knew that domestic economic circumstances often differ from those abroad
where mechanical application of domestic antitrust decisions would make little
economic, political, or social sense. Further, many appraisals of the appropriateness of
asserting jurisdiction include an appraisal of the anticompetitive harm caused by the
challenged restraint— and the latter is a largely substantive inquiry.
In examining a foreign restraint, the conclusion that Congress did not mean to cover
it might be expressed either in terms of the statute's jurisdiction or subject matter reach,
or else in terms of a substantive conclusion about the “reasonableness” of the restraint
under the circumstances. In either event, the examination must consider conflicts with
other countries, the international law and common law principles governing them, the
availability of appropriate and effective remedies, and the nature and significance of the
challenged conduct and its effects, which is what justifies the United States' interest in
the first place. The circumstances surrounding a foreign restraint may dictate a legal
conclusion different from that which would be appropriate to the same restraint at home.
The relevant differences might be found in both the quality and magnitude of the
restraint's threats to protected interests, offsetting virtues, and less restrictive
alternatives.
"Reasonableness" and the Interests of Foreign Nations
Most antitrust appraisals under United States law, whether domestic or foreign,
demand an appreciation of the challenged conduct's harm to the American economy,
redeeming benefits to the parties and society, and the alternative and less harmful
means of accomplishing legitimate ends. The foreignness of a restraint can affect each
of these three factors. Some of the anticompetitive tendencies of a particular type of
restraint might be entirely irrelevant to the United States commerce with which the
Sherman Act is concerned. Thus, the relevant harmful effects or tendencies of the
particular restraint may be fewer in number and smaller in magnitude than for the same
restraint occurring in a wholly domestic context. Indeed, foreign government regulations
*

Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law, University of Iowa.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2220911

Hovenkamp

Extraterritorial Criminal Antitrust Jurisdiction

Feb. 2013, Page 2

or other circumstances of foreign markets sometimes indicate that absent the restraint
there would be no United States commerce at all in the good in question.1
The redeeming virtues might also be different in the international context. Risks, the
need for combining complementary resources, or scale economies might be greater in
some international combinations. Or the customary terms of dealing in foreign markets
might be different such that the less restrictive alternatives available at home would not
be available abroad.
Thus the conventional assumptions that courts make in appraising restraints in
domestic markets are not necessarily applicable in foreign markets. A foreign joint
venture among competitors, for example, might be more “reasonable” than a
comparable domestic transaction in several respects: the actual or potential harms
touching American commerce may be more remote; the parties' necessities may be
greater in view of foreign market circumstances; and the alternatives may be fewer,
more burdensome, or less helpful.
Much conduct abroad, particularly involving agreements among competitors, would
be illegal per se if it were domestic—that is, it would be condemned without proof of
particular effects and with little regard for possible justifications. Does extraterritoriality
call for a fundamentally different analysis? Perhaps sometimes, but clearly not always.
Domestic antitrust policy uses per se rules for conduct that, in most of its
manifestations, is potentially very dangerous with little or no redeeming virtue. That
rationale would be inapplicable to foreign restraints that either pose very little danger to
American commerce or have more persuasive justifications than are likely in similar
restraints at home. For example, price fixing in a foreign country might have some but
very little impact on United States commerce at all. This would be true, for example, if a
naked foreign cartel made no sales into the United States, either directly or indirectly.
Alternatively, the foreign cartel it might be encouraged or even compelled by the foreign
county's domestic policy.
Nevertheless, one should not leap too quickly from the premise that additional
“reasonableness” inquiries are necessary when the restraint occurs abroad, to the
conclusion that all foreign restraints merit full rule of reason inquiries, including rigorous
market definition, market power assessment, and a conclusion supported by a welldeveloped record about overall anticompetitive effects. To be sure, we sometimes say
that the per se rule condemns practices without a showing of competitive effects in the
particular case. By contrast, appraising restraints abroad requires an assessment of
effects on American foreign commerce.
But the effects to be measured are not the same. An impact on prices or injury to
several American traders or interests might be quite sufficient to indicate a significant
effect on commerce, but identifying these effects alone would not be sufficient to a full
1

See, e.g., United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947, 958 (D. Mass.
1950) (Wyzanski, J., observing that if American exporters are denied access to a foreign country,
then any agreement overcoming the denial could not “restrain” or “monopolize,” for in its
absence there would be no trade at all).
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rule of reason inquiry, which must often make some assessment of overall market
impact and also consider defenses. This is especially true when considerations of
comity point in favor of liability. For example, the competition law of the European Union
and most countries today abhor “naked” cartels about as much as United States law
does.2 Jurisdiction in the courts of the United States over such a cartel under the
“effects” test can generally be established simply by showing that the naked price fixing
exists and that a substantial number of sales were made to United States buyers. No
considerations of comity require analysis beyond the observation that the restraint is
just as unlawful under the relevant foreign law as under the Sherman Act. At that point
the same considerations that justify a per se inquiry for a domestic cartel would apply:
Nothing is likely to be gained by a further, expensive inquiry into market definition or
power or a consideration of defenses relating to the reasonableness of the prices
charged and the like. Further, the rule of reason makes criminal prosecution virtually
impossible, yet extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction under the federal antitrust laws seems
relatively clear. Finally, discovery in rule of reason cases is difficult and costly enough in
domestic antitrust disputes. These difficulties and costs can loom far larger when the
relevant markets to be considered are abroad.
In sum, to say that domestic per se rules are not necessarily and automatically
applicable in the international context is not to say that an antitrust court needs to
hesitate very long before condemning restraints with significant and obvious effects on
United States commerce and without any plausible purpose other than the suppression
of competition with and in the United States, and in particular when United States policy
is in alignment with the policies of other affected nations. Many of the major litigated
international restraint cases fall into this category.9 In Timken, the Supreme Court
rejected a claim of “reasonableness” by defendants, who had eliminated competition
among themselves in England, France, and the United States. But the defendants' claim
was unpersuasive, given the facts that the restraint long antedated and was broader
than the claimed justification and that the court found that competition was possible and
would have occurred absent the long-standing restraint.
To this extent, the "effects" test as applied to extraterritorial jurisdiction resembles, at

2

E.g., Stichting Sigarettenindustries, Joined Cases 240-242, 261-262, 268, 269/82 E.C.R.
3831 [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) ¶14,265 (1985). See Ivo Van Bael
& Jean-Franois Bellis, Competition Law of the European Community, chs. 4-5 (4th ed. 2005);
Lennart Ritter & W. David Braun, European Competition Law: A Practitioner's Guide Ch. 3 (3d
ed. 2004).
9
See, e.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United States v.
Holophane Co., 119 F. Supp. 114 (S.D. Ohio 1954), aff'd per curiam, 325 U.S. 903 (1956);
United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), aff'd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947);
United States v. GE Co., 80 F. Supp. 989 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (price fixing and patent pooling
covering both domestic and foreign markets); United States v. GE Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J.
1949) (lamps; territorial division agreements between domestic and foreign firms); 115 F. Supp.
835 (D.N.J. 1953) (lamp remedies).
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least roughly, the “affecting commerce”, test for domestic jurisdiction.11 Strictly
speaking, one cannot appraise the Constitutionally required effect on interstate
commerce without looking at “effects” generally, an inquiry that goes beyond what is
required by the per se rule. But in fact the courts have not required such an appraisal of
actual magnitudes in the domestic setting. Rather, they simply require a showing of
some not insignificant effect or of an inference that “as a matter of practical economics”
the alleged restraint seems reasonably calculated to produce such effects. 12 The
“affecting foreign commerce” test for extraterritorial jurisdiction is not different in
principle, although conditions of comity may sometimes require somewhat more
strictness in proof. For example, once the foreign cartel and actual imports into the
United States are found, an effect on United States commerce can be presumed without
proof of the amount by which output was reduced or price increased.
At the same time, of course, one must consider the possibility of important
differences between domestic and international markets in (1) the environmental
circumstances bearing upon the “reasonableness” of a given restraint, (2) the degree to
which United States interests are significantly affected, (3) the involvement of foreign
governments, and (4) the costs and other difficulties of discovery. On the second point,
while a domestic Commerce Clause case raises concerns about local versus interstate
impact, both are markets within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
Commerce Clause limitations notwithstanding, the states are sovereigns that are still
subordinate to the federal government. By contrast, when the restraint is abroad, the
possibility arises that it has no or only limited effect on any interest that the United
States government is authorized to protect.
The other important observation about the above mentioned points is that they do
not always apply. When they do not, the general considerations of administrative
economy that justify applying the per se rule should control.
The cases are not entirely consistent with these propositions. Most significantly, in
Metro Industries the Ninth Circuit concluded that a rule of reason inquiry is necessary in
all cases involving restraints abroad:13
Because conduct occurring outside the United States is only a
violation of the Sherman Act if it has a sufficient negative impact on
commerce in the United States, per se analysis is not appropriate.
Indeed, when the alleged illegal conduct occurred in a foreign
country, we must examine the impact on commerce in the United
States before we can determine that we have subject matter
jurisdiction over a claim.14
11

See 1B PHILLIP E. AREEDA AND HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶266d (4th ed.
2013).
12
See id., ¶266f, g, discussing Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of the Rex Hospital, 425 U.S.
738, 745 (1976); and McLain v. Real Estate Bd., Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 246 (1980).
13
Metro Industries, Inc. v. Sammi Corp., 82 F.3d 839 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 868
(1996).
14
Id. at 843.
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The court later elaborated:
Thus, the potential illegality of actions occurring outside the Untied
States requires an inquiry into the impact on commerce in the
United States, regardless of the inherently suspect appearance of
the foreign activities. Consequently, where a Sherman Act claim is
based on conduct outside the United States, we apply rule of
reason analysis to determine whether there is a Sherman Act
violation.15
The court then concluded that because the defendant had not been successful in
defining a relevant market, the case must be dismissed. However, then, and more
elaborately, it also found that the restraint at issue was complex, had significant
efficiency potential, and thus a rule of reason inquiry would be necessary in any event.
Perhaps the court's conclusion that restraints abroad always require rule of reason
analysis would have been more qualified had the restraint before it belonged more
clearly in the per se category without offsetting considerations of comity.
The Empagran case16 involved a cartel that was the subject of criminal prosecution.
However, the Supreme Court never spoke of the offense in either per se or rule of
reason terms. Neither did the D.C. Circuit's initial opinion, which the Supreme Court
reversed.17 The Kruman case, which was subsequently abrogated by the Supreme
Court's Empagran decision, held that the per se rule should be applied to a cartel that
involved one American and one foreign participant, and where the foreign plaintiff had
purchased from the foreign participant.18
In its now superseded 1977 Antitrust Guidelines for International Operations, the
Department of Justice stated only that the rule of reason should have somewhat
broader application with respect to restraints abroad than over domestic restraints. This
was true for two reasons. First, the court might have less experience with the foreign
restraint; and, second, acts in foreign commerce might have some justifications that
would not be recognized in the entirely domestic setting.19 But the current international
antitrust Guidelines issued in 1994 generally ignore the issue, noting only that the
National Cooperative Research and Production Act.20 requires that qualifying joint
ventures be judged under the rule of reason—something that the Justice Department
would ordinarily do anyway for bona fide joint ventures.21 However, in measuring
“substantial” effects on United States commerce, the Guidelines appear to be ready to
look at the gross amount of such effects, rather than the proportionate impact within a
15

Id. at 845.
See F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd. v. Empagran, 542 U.S. 155 (2004).
17
Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-Laroche Ltd., 315 F.3d 338 (D.C. Cir. 2003), rev'd, 542 U.S.
155 (2004).
18
Kruman v. Christie's Intl. PLC, 284 F.3d 384, 393 (2d Cir. 2002), cert. dismissed, 539 U.S.
987 (2003).
19
Antitrust Guide for International Operations 2-3 (1977, superseded).
20
15 U.S.C. §§4301-4306.
21
Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations §2.5 (1994).
16
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relevant market.22 Further, in an example involving a naked cartel shipping goods into
the United States, the Guidelines offer only a brief analysis concluding that the
government could assert jurisdiction, with no suggestion that the rule of reason would
be applied in such a case.23 Even when prosecuting criminals under the per se rule, the
Government often issues penalties that are based on the volume of affected
commerce.3
The Metro Industries decision was correct to note that an “effect” on United States
foreign commerce must be established in a case involving activity abroad. But “effects”
tests also govern Commerce Clause jurisdiction in domestic antitrust cases. Such tests
hardly serve to undermine the per se rule. Even in per se cases, however, the court
assesses effect by asking whether “as a matter of practical economics” the restraint is
likely to have the alleged effect.24 The assessment of foreign commerce proceeds in the
same manner. Considerations of comity may sometimes require additional scrutiny in
order to ensure that a sufficient United States interest is at stake, but only if the
assertion of United States authority conflicts in an important way with the foreign
sovereign's policy.
The Metro Industries insistence on rule of reason treatment for all restraints abroad
is in fact a logical outgrowth of the Ninth Circuit's earlier and problematic Timberlane
case. That decision required judges to consider numerous softer considerations of
comity, thus permitting them to decline to address the merits of a case even when
jurisdiction under the effects test is clear and the challenged activity was not compelled
or necessarily even tolerated by foreign law.94 Unfortunately the “jurisdictional rule of
reason” that Timberlane adopted is cumbersome, often indeterminate, conducive to
lengthy and expensive discovery, and thus extremely burdensome to both litigants and
courts. While the Supreme Court's Empagran decision did not purport to overrule
Timberlane,95 the Court's much more generalized and speedier inquiry is largely
inconsistent with the burdensome, fact-laden inquiry contemplated in Timberlane.
22

Id. at §3.11.
Id., illustrative example A.
3
See, e.g., United States v. VandeBrake, 679 F.3d 1030 (8th Cir. 2012); United States v.
Andreas, 216 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Haversat, 22 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. 1994).
24
See 1B ANTITRUST LAW ¶266f1, discussing McLain v. Real Estate Bd., Inc., 444 U.S. 232,
242-247 (1980).
94
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976), on remand, 574 F.
Supp. 1453 (N.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd, 749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032
(1985).
95
The Supreme Court cited Timberlane only once, for a proposition that it agreed with:
23

See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 613
(C.A.9 1976) (insisting that the foreign conduct's domestic effect be
“sufficiently large to present a cognizable injury to the plaintiffs”
(emphasis added)).
Empagran, 542 U.S. at 173.
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One problem with Timberlane is that, notwithstanding its broad concept of comity,
the court seemed excessively receptive to considering a dispute originating on foreign
soil, and impeaching foreign judicial processes, merely because of a minor impact on
goods that might ultimately reach American shores. Ultimately, however, the court quite
correctly declined to apply United States antitrust law because the impact upon
American imports seemed trivial and the activity challenged (foreclosure of a lien in
Honduras) was peculiarly local.
A Honduran lumber firm was indebted to the Honduran branch of an American bank,
which caused Honduran liens to be placed on the former's property. The bank allegedly
bribed a Honduran judicial officer to enforce the lien and thereby close down the
operation. In violation of the Honduran court's order, the debtor had surreptitiously
assigned of some of those assets to Timberlane, an American company, which then
brought a federal antitrust action. The substantive antitrust claim was that the bank's
foreclosure was part of some vague conspiracy to prevent the plaintiff from establishing
itself in Honduras as a lumber supplier to the United States in competition with domestic
lumber sellers in which the bank had some interest.97 The jurisdictional claim was that
preventing the plaintiff's entry into the Honduran lumber business affected imports into
the United States and thus competition in the American lumber market.
We might well wonder why the Act of State doctrine did not foreclose inquiry into the
official behavior of Honduran courts and their officials.98 Further, even if all the
challenged conduct had taken place within the United States, we might also wonder
how the apparently lawful foreclosure on an indisputably valid and undoubtedly unpaid
debt could violate the antitrust laws. Indeed, in the domestic context the invoking of
legal process against a competitor is protected from antitrust challenge unless the
invocation is a “sham,” which requires a showing that asserting the legal process is
objectively unreasonable.99 Even bribery of a government official would not create
antitrust liability for the person paying the bribe.100 But let us put these questions aside
and focus on the jurisdictional test adopted by the Ninth Circuit.
The court proceeded in three steps. First, it asked the basic jurisdictional question of
whether the alleged restraint affected or was intended to affect United States foreign
commerce. It refused to require an allegation or appearance of “direct and substantial”
effects. Instead, the court held that subject matter jurisdiction is established upon a
showing of “some effect,” actual or intended, on United States commerce. The plaintiff
ultimately satisfied this test by alleging its ability and willingness to supply the American
market with lumber that would have competed in the domestic marketplace. After
defining a relevant product market and finding that United States imports from Honduras
accounted for less than 0.1 percent of the American lumber market, the district court
97

It did not appear whether the bank's interest was anything more than as a lender to other
lumber firms.
98
See 1B ANTITRUST LAW ¶274b.
99
See 1 PHILLIP E, AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP,ANTITRUST LAW, Ch. 2A-1 (4th ed.
2013).
100
See 1 ANTITRUST LAW ¶203.
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had found a measurable effect,102 notwithstanding some doubt about the market
definition. The Ninth Circuit agreed.
However, the effects test standing alone was declared inadequate because it failed
to reflect either the intensity of the foreign nation's interest, which may weigh against
applying United States law, or the relationship between the alleged offender and the
United States, which can more readily apply its own law to its citizens.
Second, the court asked whether the alleged restraint is “of such a type and
magnitude so as to be cognizable as a violation of the Sherman Act.”103 It gave an
affirmative answer on the ground that an alleged conspiracy to prevent the plaintiff from
milling lumber in Honduras and exporting it to the United States rises “to the level of a
civil antitrust violation” that “has a direct and substantial anticompetitive effect.”104
Although far from clear, the court seemed to mean that a conspiracy to obstruct a
competitor is anticompetitive without further proof—a kind of per se offense. However,
this is not a helpful description or analysis of the challenged conduct—the foreclosure of
a mortgage securing an unpaid debt—as the court may itself have recognized in
answering the next question. In all events, the court's second test seems to require the
normal proof of an antitrust violation: very little for the so-called per se offenses and
presumably much more where the rule of reason applies. Thus, while one might laud
the court's decision to include the weightiness of the substantive antitrust allegations in
its determination of whether to consider the claim, the weight given in this case seems
to have been greatly exaggerated.
Third, the court asked whether regard for international comity and fairness
counseled exerting jurisdiction over extraterritorial conduct. The distinctive holding of
Timberlane is that notwithstanding sufficient effects and an antitrust violation, the court
may still decline to assert its extraterritorial jurisdiction unless the effect on United
States commerce is sufficiently strong in the light of (1) the degree of conflict with
foreign law or policy, (2) the nationality or allegiance of the parties and their principal
places of business,107 (3) the extent to which either state can expect compliance, 108 (4)
the relative effects on the several countries involved,109 (5) an explicit purpose to harm
102

See Timberlane, 1981-1 Trade Cas. ¶65,998 (N.D. Cal. 1982); Timberlane, 574 F. Supp.
1453, 1466 (N.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd, 49 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032
(1985).
103
Timberlane, 749 F.2d at 1383.
104
Ibid.
107
Slightly in favor of jurisdiction is that all parties except one had United states citizenship,
although all the crucial witnesses were Honduran citizens or residents.
108
Slightly in favor of jurisdiction is that any money judgment against the defendant could
easily be enforced.
109
Strongly against jurisdiction is the minuscule effect on United States lumber markets, in
which all Honduran lumber accounts for less than 0.1 percent of the total and less than 4 percent
of pine imports. Not only are the effects more significant on the Honduran lumber market, but
the bank's actions also affect employment there, foreign exchange, taxes, and internal
competition.
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or affect United States commerce110 and the foreseeability of such an effect,111 and (6)
the relative importance of conduct inside the United States.112
After some ten years of litigation, the court dismissed the case, relying in essence on
the legitimacy of the defendant's behavior within Honduras and the minuscule effects on
competition in the United States. Interestingly, he court concluded that a request for
dismissal of a claim under its “jurisdictional rule of reason” should be raised under Fed.
R. Civ. 12(b)(1) as a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, rather than
as a motion under 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim or as a motion for summary
judgment.4
A jurisdictional test that requires a decade of litigation to dispose of so insubstantial
an antitrust claim seems much too unmanageable. Most important, some of the factors
that the court cites—such as the relative effects of the defendant's conduct on the
countries involved—require significant analysis of the merits of the antitrust dispute and
the economic conditions and policies of the relevant countries.
Further, while the court listed the numerous and varied factors set forth above, it
gave little in the way of a calculus or standard for assessing the weight of each or how
they should trade against one another. The result may yield a clear decision when all, or
nearly all, of the factors point in one direction. But the Timberlane test is calculated to
produce much confusion and indeterminacy when the factors are divided.
Finally, given the insubstantial nature of the substantive claim, one wonders whether
the court should have turned to such a complicated jurisdictional test at all. To be sure,
the “jurisdictional” question as well as related questions of comity logically precede the
decision on the merits, but in at least some cases where a very quick analysis of the
merits shows the absence of any antitrust issue, dismissal should be appropriate for
that reason, without application of so cumbersome a rule as the Timberlane court
developed.
For example, if a quick look at the complaint and answer tells us beyond reasonable
dispute that the antitrust suit's basis is the defendant's invocation of Honduran judicial
process to enforce an apparently valid debt, use of Timberlane's complex jurisdictional
inquiry seems quite unnecessary. At the very least, one might say, the plaintiff must
present a minimally plausible claim on the merits before the court is obliged to turn to
complex jurisdictional inquiries. Under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, suing to collect a
110

Against jurisdiction is that the defendant's acts were directed primarily toward securing a
greater return on its investment and were consistent with Honduran customs and practices; the
plaintiff did not show that the defendant had any particular interest in affecting United States
commerce.
111
Against jurisdiction is that the defendant simply enforced its mortgage in an attempt to
recoup its investment. The effects were simply those that flow inevitably from attempting to
salvage something from a failing business. No reasonable investor would have foreseen the
minimal effect on the United States that occurred here.
112
Against jurisdiction is that virtually all the alleged illegal activity occurred in Honduras.
4
Timberlane, 574 F.Supp. at 1460-1461.
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valid debt would be immune from the antitrust laws if the lawsuit had been filed in a
United States court; the reasons for immunizing such a lawsuit when it occurs in a
foreign court are at least as strong.
Criminal Liability for Extraterritorial Anticompetitive Conduct
Harming U.S. Interests
The language of the Sherman Act applies its prohibitions to both foreign and
domestic commerce and also provides that a violation can be a felony.163 Thus the
statutory language certainly does not preclude that antitrust violations in foreign
commerce could be criminal acts as well. At the same time, the government's longstanding policy and the ruling case law make only a small subset of violations criminal
acts, and one might perhaps conclude that only acts committed within United States
territory should constitute criminal violations. Traditionally, American courts followed
Justice Holmes's prescription in the American Banana case.165 that criminal jurisdiction
was strictly territorial.166 However, in Pacific & Arctic Rwy.,167 the Supreme Court
acknowledged that criminal antitrust jurisdiction could be obtained over all participants
in a conspiracy that included both foreign and United States members.
Today general criminal liability can be and frequently is attached to acts committed
entirely outside the sovereign's territory,168 and the Sherman Act states no obvious
reason why it should be treated as any different from other criminal statutes. The
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law takes this position:

The principles governing [extraterritorial reach] apply to criminal as
well as civil litigation. However, in the case of regulatory statutes
that may give rise to both civil and criminal liability, such as United
States antitrust and securities law, the presence of substantial
foreign elements will ordinarily weigh against application of criminal
law. In such cases, legislative intent to subject conduct outside the
state's territory to its criminal law should be found only on the basis
163

"Every contract, combination … or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce … with
foreign nations is illegal. Every person who shall make [such a contract] shall be deemed guilty
of a felony…" 15 U.S.C. §1.
165
See American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
166
See, e.g., United States v. Columba-Colella, 604 F.2d 356, 360 (5th Cir. 1979) (Mexican
national's agreement, executed in Mexico, to sell a car in Mexico that had been stolen in the
United States not within jurisdiction of the United States courts).
167
See United States v. Pacific & Arctic Ry. & Nav. Co., 228 U.S. 87, 106 (1913).
168
See, e.g., United States v. Perez-Herrera, 610 F.2d 289, 290 (5th Cir. 1980) (agreement to
smuggle marijuana into United States within jurisdiction of United States courts even though all
relevant acts were committed abroad).
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of express statement or clear implication.169
In Nippon the First Circuit concluded that price fixing that had occurred in Japan
could be the subject of a United States criminal indictment.170 Nippon and unnamed coconspirators were accused of fixing the price of facsimile paper sold in North America,
including the United States. The relevant meetings culminating in the challenged
agreement all occurred in Japan. The alleged agreement was apparently facilitated with
resale price maintenance agreements under which firms purchasing the paper in Japan
promised to resell it at specified minimum prices in North America.171 Nippon then
allegedly monitored resale prices within the United States in order to ensure that the
maintained price was the one actually charged.
In analyzing the Sherman Act and its case law,172 the court concluded that “one
datum sticks out like a sore thumb”— namely, “in both criminal and civil cases, the claim
that Section One applies extraterritorially is based on the same language in the same
section of the same statute…”173 and
common sense suggests that courts should interpret the same
language in the same section of the same statute uniformly,
regardless of whether the impetus for interpretation is criminal or
civil.174
The court then concluded:
169

Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law §403, comment f (1986). The government's
Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations §2.1 (1994) expressly leave open
the possibility of criminal prosecution for acts occurring abroad. Section 2.91 of the Guidelines
also discusses treaties providing for bilateral criminal enforcement agreements, and illustrative
example H notes that the Department has and will continue to explore the possibility of seeking
the aid of local law in pursuing violations abroad. But the Guidelines then warn that if “…local
law does not provide adequate remedies, or the local authorities are not prepared to take action,
the Department will weigh the comity factors, discussed in Section 3.2 infra, and take such
action as is appropriate…” These Guidelines are reprinted in Appendix B of the Supplement.
170
United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., Ltd., 109 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
522 U.S. 1044 (1998).
171
On the use of resale price maintenance to facilitate manufacturer collusion, see 8 PHILLIP
E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP ¶1606 (3d ed. 2011).
172
Just like the Supreme Court in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764,
796 (1993), the First Circuit refused to place any weight on the Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. §6a. Of course, that Act was not intended to cover the situation of
a foreign cartel targeting United States markets, although it might limit recovery against a United
States cartel targeting foreign markets. Significantly, however, nothing in the FTAIA limits its
reach to non criminal actions.
173
Nippon, supra, 109 F.3d at 4.
174
Ibid. The court then cited a basic canon of statutory construction that “identical words or
terms used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning,” citing
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Lundy, 516 U.S. 235 (1996); Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc.,
513 U.S. 561, 569 (1995).
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It follows, therefore, that if the language upon which the indictment
rests were the same as the language upon which civil liability rests
but appeared in a different section of the Sherman Act, or in a
different part of the same section, we would be under great
pressure to follow the lead of the Hartford Fire Court.175 and
construe the two iterations of the language identically. Where, as
here, the tie binds more tightly—that is, the text under consideration
is not merely a duplicate appearing somewhere else in the statute,
but is the original phrase in the original setting—the pressure
escalates and the case for reading the language in a manner
consonant with a prior Supreme Court interpretation is
irresistible.176
Thus, for the First Circuit the question of determining the appropriateness of
extraterritorial criminal prosecution was entirely one of parsing the language of the
statute, which—as we have noted before—never distinguishes its criminal and civil
applications. A concurring judge expressed reservations about this approach and
concluded that:
The task of construing Section One in this context is not the usual
one of determining congressional intent by parsing the language or
legislative history of the statute. The broad, general language of the
federal antitrust laws and their unilluminating legislative history
place a special interpretive responsibility upon the judiciary.5
Nevertheless the judge found criminal jurisdiction appropriate in a case where
raising prices in the United States was not only a foreseeable result of the
challenged act, but it was also the principal and intended result.
The court rejected the defendant's argument that the lack of any precedent made the
invocation of criminal liability improper—that is, the case law failed to give the foreign
actor fair notice that its wholly extraterritorial act might subject it to criminal antitrust
prosecution.178 But as the court noted, while there is little in the way of antitrust
precedent for applying a United States criminal statute to extraterritorial conduct, there
was ample precedent from other statutes.179 For example, the manufacturing and sale
of addictive drugs abroad targeting United States markets has frequently been
condemned under criminal statutes notwithstanding that the defendants performed no

175

See Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
Nippon, 109 F.3d at 5.
5
Nippon, supra, 109 F.3d at 9.
178
Id.at 6.
179
Ibid. at 6, citing Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911) (criminal acts committed in
one state but causing injury in another state created jurisdiction in the latter when defendant
intended to cause harmful consequences there).
176
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acts within the United States.180 Of course, the drug laws are explicitly criminal
provisions, consistently enforced both inside and outside the United States. As a result,
citation to them does not fully address the additional problems confronted by application
of the Sherman Act, because that statute is now more than a century old, with little
history of criminal prosecution for purely extraterritorial acts. At the same time, however,
the alleged conduct in this case, although committed abroad, unquestionably targeted
United States markets and was allegedly committed in a clandestine fashion so as to
avoid detection and prosecution. Further, comity did not counsel against application of
United States law, for the alleged acts were unlawful under Japanese as well as United
States Law.181
"Interest" Analysis
One important rationale for expansive reach and even criminal punishment in such
cases is that the sovereign representing purchasers typically has a greater interest than
the sovereign represei.nting sellers. As a general matter, a cartel in one country fixing
the price of its goods elsewhere transfers wealth away from the territory containing the
buyers and toward the territory containing the sellers. As a result, sovereigns, including
the United States itself, have typically been less concerned with condemning restraints
on export trade where all the buyers are foreign than with restraints on imports. This
aspect of United States policy is reflected in the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements
Act (FTAIA)6 as well as the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States.
Thus an essentially territorial mode of analysis that looks at where the conspiracy
was “formed”183 seems much less appropriate to the general policy question than an
“interest” analysis considering where the victims are. In this case the predominant,
although perhaps not the only,184 victims of the alleged conspiracy were consumers in
180

Chua Han Mow v. United States, 730 F.2d 1308, 1311-1312 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
470 U.S. 1031 (1985) (unlawful drug trafficking from Malaysia into United States); United
States v. Hayes, 653 F.2d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 1981) (defendant intercepted by Coast Guard while at
sea but en route to United States attempting to import unlawful drugs).
181
Nippon, supra,109 F.3d at 8. The court did not note the position frequently urged by the
government and quite often accepted that comity concerns either do not weigh heavily or should
not be considered at all in a case where the federal government itself is bringing suit. See
¶273c5. Ultimately, the lower court found that the alleged criminal conspiracy abroad had
insufficient effect on foreign commerce during the limitation period. United States v. Nippon
Paper Indus., Ltd., 62 F. Supp. 2d 173 (D. Mass. 1999).
6
See 1B ANTITRUST LAW ¶272i (4th ed. 2013).
183
E.g., American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909),United States v.
Pacific & Arctic Ry. & Nav. Co., 228 U.S. 87 (1913), & Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66 (1917).
184
A Japanese cartel shipping all the cartelized goods elsewhere would have to reduce its
output of goods into the cartelized market, perhaps with the result of a decline in locally
consumed inputs, including employment. The size or impact of this decline would vary with the
circumstances. For example, if the labor market were perfectly competitive, decreased
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North America, where the cartel was targeted. By contrast, the principal beneficiaries
were the owners of Japanese firms, perhaps their employees, perhaps the governments
that taxed them, and perhaps others.185 This makes United States authorities a more
appropriate criminal prosecutor than Japanese authorities, at least until we consider
problems of obtaining essential testimony, other evidence, and a suitable criminal
penalty. As the concurring opinion pointed out, relying heavily on the Restatement of
Foreign Relations Law:
Because only North American markets were targeted, the United
States' interest in combatting this activity appears to be greater
than the Japanese interest, which may only be the general interest
of a state in having its industries comport with foreign legal norms.
Japan has no interest in protecting Japanese consumers in this
case as they were unaffected by the alleged conspiracy. The
United States, in contrast, has a strong interest in protecting United
States consumers, who were affected by the increase in prices.7
Conclusion
In its 2012 AU Optronics decision a district court in California held that the
government has the authority to pursue price fixing that occurred abroad under a per se
rule, which is generally a predicate to criminal liability. 8 The court distinguished the
Ninth Circuit's Metro Industries decision, which had held that wholly extraterritorial acts
are to be governed by the rule of reason.9 In that case, as the Au Optronics court had
observed in a previous decision, the conduct itself was novel and strongly suggested a
rule of reason approach quite aside from the extraterritorial question.10

production of Japanese fax paper would shift some labor away from fax paper production and to
other production, but would have no impact on the overall labor market.
185
Nippon, 109 F.3d at 12.
7
Nippon, 109 F.3d at 12 (relying heavily on the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
Law of the United States, §§403, 415).
8
United States v. AU Optronics Corp., 2012 WL 2120452 (N.D.Cal. June 11, 2012). The
district court granted the government's motion in limine and obtained an order:
prohibiting defendants from presenting any evidence or argument that: (1) the
agreements to fix or stabilize prices were “reasonable” or justifiable; (2) there were
economic, benevolent, or other justifications for the agreements to fix or stabilize prices;
(3) the agreements to fix or stabilize prices created real or imagined economic
efficiencies for the defendants and their coconspirators; (4) agreements to fix or stabilize
prices were necessary to avoid ruinous competition; (5) prices set for TFT-LCDs set by
an agreement to fix or stabilize prices were reasonable; or (6) any variations on the
foregoing.
9
Metro Industries, Inc. v. Sammi Corp., 82 F.3d 839 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 868
(1996).
10
See United States v. Hsuan Bin Chen, 2011 WL 332713 (N.D.Cal. Jan. 29, 2011).
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In any event, the Metro Industries holding is not mandated by the Constitution or the
statutory text in any antitrust provision, and it seems unwise as a matter of policy. The
purpose of the distinction between the per se rule and rule of reason is to identify and
distinguish situations where anticompetitive effects can be assessed at relatively low
administrative costs from those that require more complete analysis. While the Ninth
Circuit has spoken of a "jurisdictional" rule of reason, merging considerations of comity,
foreign interests, and domestic effects from extraterritorial conduct into questions about
market definition and competitive impact unnecessarily complicates a set of queries that
are already complicated enough and are in fact quite different from one another.
At the same time, however, the "affects" query takes on additional relevance in
cases involving extraterritorial conduct, because legislative jurisdiction under the
Commerce Clause or statutory reach under the Sherman Act or FTAIA require some
harmful effect in the United States. Thus, for example, a naked cartel abroad can be
made subject to a criminal indictment and per se treatment. However, the government
would also have to show a sufficient effect justifying invocation of United States law -for example, that some of the price-fixed goods were shipped into the United States.
Showing such an affect need not require a market definition; indeed, the purpose of per
se inquiries is to identify circumstances where these effects are deemed inherent in the
practice itself.
Interestingly, in AT&T Mobility the Ninth Circuit subsequently held that California's
Cartwright Act, a state antitrust law permitting indirect purchaser claims, had
extraterritorial application in a per se price fixing case involving foreign conduct similar
to that at issue in the Au Optronics case.11 Considerations of comity with foreign nations
and other elements of extraterritorial jurisdiction weigh at least as heavily when the law
to be applied is state rather than federal.

11

AT&T Mobility, LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., ___ F.3d ___, 2013 WL 540859 (9th Cir.
Feb. 14, 2013).

